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Cryptovirological augmentations present an immediate, incom-
parable threat. Over the last decade, the substantial proliferation
of crypto-ransomware has had widespread consequences for con-
sumers and organisations alike. Established preventive measures
perform well, however, the problem has not ceased. Reverse
engineering potentially malicious software is a cumbersome task
due to platform eccentricities and obfuscated transmutation
mechanisms, hence requiring smarter, more efficient detection
strategies. The following manuscript presents a novel approach
for the classification of cryptographic primitives in compiled
binary executables using deep learning. The model blueprint,
a Dynamic Convolutional Neural Network (DCNN), is fittingly
configured to learn from variable-length control flow diagnostics
output from a dynamic trace. To rival the size and variability
of contemporary data compendiums, hence feeding the model
cognition, a methodology for the procedural generation of syn-
thetic cryptographic binaries is defined, utilising core primitives
from OpenSSL with multivariate obfuscation, to draw a vastly
scalable distribution. The library, CryptoKnight, rendered an
algorithmic pool of AES, RC4, Blowfish, MD5 and RSA to
synthesis combinable variants which are automatically fed in
its core model. Converging at 91% accuracy, CryptoKnight is
successfully able to classify the sample algorithms with minimal
loss.
Index Terms—Deep Learning, Convolutional Neural Network,
Cryptovirology, Ransomware, Binary Analysis
I. INTRODUCTION
THE idea of cryptovirology was first introduced by [1]to describe the offensive nature of cryptography for
extortion-based security threats. It comprises a set of revo-
lutionary attacks that combine strong (symmetric and asym-
metric) cryptographic techniques with unique viral technology.
The fierce proliferation of ‘crypto-ransomware’ is rather trou-
bling for a number of reasons. Designed to infect, encrypt
and lock-down available hosts, this category of malware has
had disastrous consequences for many [2] [3]. For those who
can afford to reclaim their private data, the financial loss is
typically quite substantial, despite the fact that there is no
guaranteed recovery. Ultimately, without a backup, there is
little that can be done. Preventative frameworks have been
proven to effectively halt unusual activity [4] [5] by closely
monitoring the file system’s input / output, but administrators
are not always likely to follow best practices [6]. In any
case, unknown weaknesses can still be exploited to further
an attacker’s goal.
The cryptovirological landscape has evolved in recent years.
A distinct growth has been noted in the overall number
of targeted attacks and variants [7]. A long-term study of
1,359 ransomware samples [4] observed between 2006 and
2014 found a distinct number of variants with cryptographic
capabilities. During analysis, these instances were found to
utilise both standard and customised cryptography with gen-
erational enhancements, specifically in terms of key gener-
ation and management. Tailored cryptosystems particularly
limit the scale of effective analysis [8]. Infamous variants
are known to have employed well-established documented
algorithms [8] [9], but a number of deviations are signif-
icant. In some instances, malware variants have employed
custom ‘cryptography’, lesser-known algorithms (such as the
Soviet/Russian symmetric block cipher GOST [10]), common
substitution-ciphers, or exclusively, encoding mechanisms.
The field of malware analysis seeks to determine the
potential impact of malicious software by examining it in
a controlled environment. Investigators find flaws otherwise
unknown to current identification technologies - sourcing keys
and blocking further infection [2]. When reverse engineering
a potentially malicious executable, several issues should be
addressed. Possible problems include the accuracy of analysis,
quality of the application’s obfuscation, and the lifetime of
findings. The analysis of a binary can typically be considered
from two viewpoints: static or dynamic. Static analysis is per-
formed in a non-runtime environment, therefore examination
is relatively safe; however potential morphism restricts the
accuracy of results [11] [12]. Alternatively, dynamic analy-
sis [13] sequentially assesses a binary throughout its execu-
tion, which can provide significantly more accurate results
and contend with obfuscatory measures [14] [15], but if not
properly handled, samples could prove somewhat hazardous.
This manuscript focuses on the latter methodology.
Cryptographic algorithm identification facilitates malware
analysis in a number of ways, but in this case, when assessing
ransomware strains, it yields a starting point for investigation.
This is essential when analytical time is restricted. With the un-
certainty surrounding an application’s custom, undocumented
or established cryptosystem, analysts struggle to maintain
complete awareness of the field - which makes this task ideal
for automation. To effectively model cryptographic execution,
previous research has relied on a number of assumptions and
observations. These features do not necessarily always depict
cryptographic code, but provide a baseline for analysis. For
instance, cryptographic algorithms naturally involve the use
of bitwise integer arithmetic and logical operations. These
activities frequently reside in loops, for example, block ciphers
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2typically loop over an input buffer to decrypt it block-by-block.
[8] also postulated that any encrypted data is likely to have a
higher information entropy than decrypted data.
Deep learning studies intricate Artificial Neural Networks
(ANNs) with multiple hidden computational layers [16] that
effectively model representations of data with multiple layers
of abstraction, in which the high-level representations can
amplify aspects of the input that are important for discrim-
ination. These techniques have been used amongst others
to identify network threats [17] or encrypted traffic on a
network [18] [19]. A Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), is
a specialised architecture of ANN that employs a convolution
operation in at least one of its layers [20] [21]. A variety of
substantiated CNN architectures have been used to great effect
in computer vision [22] and even Natural Language Processing
(NLP), with empirically distinguished superiority in semantic
matching [23], compared to other models.
CryptoKnight is developed in coordination with this
methodology. We introduce a scalable learning system that
can easily incorporate new samples through the scalable syn-
thesis of customisable cryptographic algorithms. Its entirely
automated core architecture is aimed to minimise human
interaction, thus allowing the composition of an effective
model. We tested the framework on a number of externally
sourced applications utilising non-library linked functionality.
Our experimental analysis indicates that CryptoKnight is a
flexible solution that can quickly learn from new crypto-
graphic execution patterns to classify unknown software. This
manuscript presents the following contributions:
• Our unique convolutional neural network architecture
fits variable-length data to map an application’s time-
invariant cryptographic execution.
• Complimented by procedural synthesis, we address the
issue of this task’s disproportionate latent feature space.
• The realised framework, CryptoKnight, has demonstrably
faster results compared to that of previous methodologies,
and is extensively re-trainable.
II. RELATED WORK
The cryptovirological threat model has rapidly evolved over
the last decade. A number of notable individuals and research
groups have attempted to address the problem of cryptographic
primitive identification. We will discuss the consequences of
their findings here and address intrinsic problems.
A. Heuristics
Heuristical methods [24] are often utilised to locate an
optimal strategy for capturing the most appropriate solution.
These measures have previously shown great success in cryp-
tographic primitive identification. A joint project from ETH
Zu¨rich and Google, Inc. [8] detailed the automated decryption
of encrypted network communication in memory, to identify
the location and time a subject binary interacted with de-
crypted input. From an execution trace which dynamically
extracted memory access patterns and control flow data [8],
was able to identify the necessary factors required to retrieve
the relevant data in a new process. His implementation was
successfully able to identify the location of several decrypted
webpages in memory fetched using cURL and OpenSSL, and
successfully extracted the decrypted output from a Kraken
malware binary. The entropy metric was found to negatively
affect the recognition of simple substitution ciphers as they do
not typically effect the information entropy, which was also
found to affect the analysis of GnuPG.
Gro¨bert at al. [25] [9] utilised fine-grained dynamic binary
analysis to generate a high-level control flow graph for eval-
uation using three heuristics. The chains heuristic measured
the ordered concatenation of all mnemonics in a basic block,
comparing known signatures; the mnemonic-const heuristic
extent the former method by assessing the combination of
instructions and constants; and the verifier heuristic confirmed
a relationship between the input and output (I/O) of a permu-
tation block. Trialled on cURL, the tool detected both Rivest-
Shamir-Adleman (RSA) and Advanced Encryption Standard
(AES) in a traced Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) session. When
tested on a real-world malware sample,GpCode, the operation
successfully detected the cryptosystem and extracted its keys.
However, the trace took fourteen hours with an extra eight
hours for analysis.
The Crypto Intelligence System [26] conglomerates a num-
ber of these heuristical measures to counter the problem of
situational dependencies. As cryptography can be reduced
to Rice’s Theorem, it is suggested that different heuristics
can provide more accurate readings. Evaluating the detection
methods used by [8] and [25], Matenaar et al. found that [27]
presented the least false positives in their tests. However, in
presenting these comparisons, the problem with heuristics is
shown as in that they do not always generalise suitably.
B. Machine Learning
Attempting to address a difficulty with past methodologies,
one thesis [28] studied the suitability of machine learning.
While automated and highly efficient, thresholds [9] [11] [14]
often require manual adjustment to manage the identification
of new algorithmic samples. Hosfelt sought to emphasise the
ease of model retraining by analysing the performance of:
Support Vector Machine, Kernels, Naive Bayes, Decision Tree
and K-means Clustering. The study was met with varying
success, but ultimately suffered from a limited sampling of
the latent feature space, preventing adequate scaling for more
complex data - i.e. multi-purpose applications that may use
cryptography in addition to other functions that may unin-
tentionally obfuscate the control flow. EldeRan [29] similarly
assessed the suitability of automated dynamic analysis for
ransomware. A regularized logistic regression classifier was
utilised in conjuncture with a dataset of 582 ransomware and
942 ‘good’ applications - thus producing an Area Under Curve
(AUC) of 0.995. While the results in this case were positive,
the methodology required a large number of malicious samples
to have been run to generate a sufficient distribution.
C. Obfuscation
A tool by the name of CryptoHunt [14] was recently devel-
oped to identify cryptographic implementations in binary code
3Fig. 1: Framework Architecture
despite advanced obfuscation. The implementation tracked the
dynamic execution of a reference binary at instruction level,
to further identify and transform loop bodies into boolean
formulas. Each formula was designed to successfully abstract
the particular primitive, but remain compact to describe the
most emblematic features. Unlike sole I/O verification, per-
formed by [9], this semantic depth more prominently revealed
distinguishable features regardless of obfuscation. Aligot [30]
was also designed for obfuscatory resilience, but instead chose
to focus on I/O. Both tools performed well on a variety of
samples, but required pre-existing reference implementations
and manual integration.
D. Data Flow Analysis
Two papers studied representational patterns of crypto-
graphic data through dynamic analysis [31] [32]. By closely
monitoring an application’s I/O each methodology aimed to
pinpoint a cryptographic algorithm that matched a similar
pattern. [15] alternatively assessed the ‘avalanche effect’ as
a unique discriminatory feature, where a small change in the
input would dramatically alter the output. Although effective,
none of the methods would likely adapt to unique obfuscations.
A unique and fairly effective approach for the identification
of symmetric algorithms in binary code was based on sub-
graph isomorphism and static analysis [11]. Lestringant et al.
resolved each cryptographic algorithm to a Data Flow Graph
(DFG), normalising their structure without breaking semantics.
The proposed subgraph isomorphism step then assessed which
signatures were contained within the normalised DFG. For the
targeted sample pool (XTEA, Message Digest 5 (MD5), AES),
their implementation reached 100% accuracy. Unfortunately,
the formula relied on the manual selection of appropriate
signatures which distinguish the applicable algorithms. For
these three instances, generation was elementary, but would
not realistically scale to the dimensions sought in this paper.
III. OVERVIEW
With any given subject application, this methodology aims
to automatically verify the existence of pre-determined cryp-
tographic signatures in unknown binary code. The intention is
to provide a solution that can easily generalise when presented
with new conditions, without manually adjusting a number of
thresholds. The full system, as in Figure 1, is comprised of
three higher-level stages.
1) Procedural generation guides the synthesis of unique
cryptographic binaries with variable obfuscation and
alternate compilation.
2) Assumptions of cryptographic code aid the discrim-
ination of diagnostics from the dynamic analysis of
synthetic or reference binaries, to build an ‘image’ of
execution.
3) A DCNN fits variable-length matrices for ease of train-
ing and the immediate classification of new samples.
IV. SYNTHESIS
To construct a reasonably sized dataset with enough vari-
ation to satisfy the abstraction of cryptographic primitives,
it is not enough to simply hand-write a small number of
applications with little diversity in terms of operational out-
liers. For example, extracting features from the execution
of a manually implemented single-purpose binary may give
an appropriate feature vector, but re-running the extraction
process will not provide any variation for repeating labels,
outside of environmental setup. This methodology leverages
procedural generation to include elements that provide some
obfuscation without directly altering the intended control flow.
For the three main algorithmic categories - symmetric, asym-
metric and hashing - interpretation should correlate the related
components to dynamically construct a unique executable.
A. Artefacts
OpenSSL is an open source cryptographic library that pro-
vides an Application Programming Interface (API) for access-
ing its algorithmic definitions. Review of its documentation re-
vealed a number of similarities in the intended implementation
of the each function. These specificities are either: variable,
differ for each primitive; or constant, true for each category.
This approach exclusively examined C in experimentation, but
C++ can also be integrated.
4Via appropriate headers, an application first imports the
libraries which provide the expectant functionality when later
compiled. In this case, from either OpenSSL or the C Stan-
dard Library. Each primitive naturally requires contrastive
functionality, so this is variable. Within the scope of an
application’s main body however, each symmetric algorithm
requires the specification of a key and Initialization Vector
(IV), asymmetric algorithms require a certificate declaration
whereas hashing definitions do not expect either. These rules
are categorically constant, therefore, their definitions can be
specified by type. Next, a plaintext sequence is loaded into
memory - directly or from a file - and ciphertext memory
is allocated, also constant. Each sample will then employ its
unique algorithm through differing declarations, reading in the
plaintext, key or IV.
B. Obfuscation
Two primary transformation mechanisms were highlighted
by [14]. The first technique discusses the abstraction of
relevant data groups to decrease their perceptible mapping. For
example, a multidimensional array may be concatenated into
a single column and either expanded or accessed as necessary.
The second technique concerns itself with the splitting of
variables [33] to disguise their representation. Colloquially
known as ‘data aggregation’ and ‘data splitting’, these methods
partially obfuscate the data flow without subtracting from a
application’s distinct activity.
Outside of such distinct obfuscation, the inclusion of struc-
tured loops, arithmetical or bitwise operations create dis-
criminatory irregularity in an otherwise translucent process.
Analogously, many ‘training’ images for computer vision will
contain noise that suitably detract from the trivial classification
of its subject. This process aims to replicate such uncertainty.
C. Interpretation
Formatting each respective variable artefact to allow ease
of parsing in a similarly structured markup tree will allow
the interpretation of unique cryptographic applications with
alternate obfuscation. Stochastically generated keys, IVs and
plaintext will add additional variation into each image. Algo-
rithm 1 outlines the pseudo-code for this procedure.
Algorithm 1 Cryptographic Synthesis
Input: cryptographic constants & variables
Output: application code
New Sample :
1: select obfuscation - (aggregation, split, normal)
2: write to file:
import statements
abstracted keys
encryption routines
3: inject randomised arithmetic
4: return relative location
When compiling the resultant collection of cryptographic
applications, data variability can be further increased. With
alternate compilers or optimisation options, the resultant object
code will dramatically fluctuate. Real-world instances are
rarely compiled identically so multivariate output can provide
further assurance for generalisation.
V. FEATURE EXTRACTION
Cryptographic execution is time-invariant. Therefore, a ref-
erence binary may employ its associated functions at any point
within a trace. Unintentional obfuscation of the control flow
will negatively affect discriminatory performance, so granu-
larity needs to be high. An underlying problem of previous
work [28]. This following approach opts to draw appropriate
features from a reference binary using dynamic instrumen-
tation via Intel’s Pin API. Through the disassembly of run-
time instruction data, this section’s outlined measurements
principally assess the activity’s importance in relation to the
assumptions of cryptographic code.
A. Basic Blocks & Loops
A Basic Block (BBL) is a sequential series of instructions
executed in a particular order, exclusively defined when there
is one branch in (entry) and one branch out (exit). A BBL
ends with one of the following conditions.
• unconditional or conditional branch - direct / indirect.
• return to caller.
Each instruction is evaluated in a linear trace, if any criteria
are met, it is marked as a tail. The following instruction is
delimited as the head of the subsequent sequence, but can
similarly be identified as a tail. The ‘stack’ of execution
stores relevant data from each instruction, and two boolean
expressions indicate the predetermined blocks. As each BBL
is dynamically revealed, non-executed instructions will un-
fortunately not be observed [9], but we can monitor indirect
branches.
Many high level languages share a distinctly strict definition
of a loop, contrarily, common interpretations of amorphous
code are loose. Extending previous definitions [34] [35] we
hence delineate a loop upon the immediate re-iteration of any
BBL, as output from Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Instruction Sequencing, BBL Detection
Input: run-time hooks
Output: path of execution
Callback :
1: head = false
2: if (last instruction is tail) then
3: head = true
4: end if
5: if (instruction is branch, call or return) then
6: tail = true
7: else
8: tail = false
9: end if
10: if (write) then
11: get entropy (memory write)
12: end if
13: return stack
5B. Instructions
Conventional architectures use a common instruction for-
mat, interpretable as: opcode operand (destination/source). In
x86, there are zero to three operands (separated by commas),
two of which specify the destination and source. For exam-
ple, when AES performs a single round of an encryption
flow it calls the instruction 66 0f 38 dc d1 which can be
disassembled as aesenc xmm2, xmm1. Directly operating on
the first operand, in this case xmm2, it performs a round of
AES encryption using the 128-bit round key from xmm1. Al-
though this is a interesting example, the Advanced Encryption
Standard New Instructions (AES-NI) architecture presents a
problem for later generalisation as cryptographic acceleration
prevents detailed analysis.
Alternate object code is typically quite distinctive, espe-
cially in cryptographic code. A primitive may employ a num-
ber of operations, in any order, and it is important not to dwell
on specificities - i.e. exact semantics. For each instruction
in the ‘carved’ linear trace we weight its ratio of bitwise
operations upon the cross-correlation of prominent operators
from a pool of cryptographic routines for discriminatory
emphasis.
C. Entropy
As characterized by [36], the associated uncertainty of a
finite discrete probability distribution p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) can
be measured using Shannon’s Entropy. Suppose pk > 0(k =
1, 2, . . . , n) and
∑n
k=1 pk = 1, distribution p is measured by
quantity H[p] = H(p1, p2, . . . , pn) hence defined as:
H(p1, p2, . . . , pn) =
n∑
k=1
pklog2
1
pk
(1)
Upon detecting a memory write, the respective location’s
contents can be replicated. Casting its value to distribution p
will allow the immediate calculation of H[p]. Related memory
can then be deleted to prevent unnecessary exhaustion. Each
BBLs absolute entropy increase / decrease can then be scored
by its relation to prior activations over opposing registers and
then summated as in Figure 2 where each BBL is ∈W.
VI. MODEL
Founded in earlier research [37], this proposed definition
of DCNN treats the input in a manner similar to that of a
sentence. For each word, embeddings are defined as d, where
di corresponds to the total weight of a particular operation,
multiplied by its entropic score. Feature vector wi ∈Wd is a
therefore a column in sentence matrix s such that s ∈Wd×s.
Let’s say w = 128, exclusively assessing pure arithmetic
impact would make d = 12, so s would equal 12 × 128.
The model itself combines a number of one wide convolutions
with (dynamic) k-max pooling and folding to map variable-
length input. Topologically presented in Figure 3, the model
combines a number of one wide convolutions with (dynamic)
k-max pooling and folding to map variable-length input.
Mathematically, convolution is an operation on two func-
tions of a real-valued argument, in this case a vector of weights
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Fig. 2: Entropy Scoring
The relative entropy scoring (y) of each BBL (x) within a trace
from a sample set of algorithms.
m ∈ Wm and a vector of inputs s ∈ Ws, to yield a new
sequence c. With kernel m, the convolved sequence in a one-
wide convolution takes the form c ∈ Rs+m−1, thus preserving
the number of defined embeddings.
Equation 2 describes the selection of k, a distinct subset of s
that most relevantly depicts an l-th orders progression. Based
on the total number of convolutional layers L, the current
layer l, the projected sentence length s and the predefined
final pooling parameter ktop, any particular layer’s selection
is delimited as:
kl = max(ktop, [
L− l
L
s]) (2)
With value k and sequence p ∈ Rp of length p ≥ k the base
k-max pooling operation selects the subsequence pkmax of the
k most active features. Completely unreactive to positional
variation, it not only preserves the original perspective, but
can also distinguish repetitious features. Since identifiable
cryptographic routines may execute at any point in a sequential
trace, this operation fits perfectly.
Another significant phase in this procedure simplifies
the way the model perceives complex dependencies over
rows. Veritable feature independence is removed through
component-wise summation of every two rows, shrinking d/2.
Nested between a convolutional layer and (dynamic) k-max
pooling, a folding layer halves the respective matrix.
While the model itself can automatically scale with new
variants, a number of hyper-parameters may need to be ad-
6justed to better suit the sample pool. Manual tuning is an
inefficient, costly process that frequently offers no advantage.
[38] empirically show that randomly chosen trials are more
efficient for hyper-parameter optimization than manual or
grid search over the same domain - calculating the most
viable constants in a fraction of the time. Taking the shuffled
Cartesian product of all hyper-parameter subsets allows the
ambiguated selection of distinct constants for trial on a small
number of epochs.
Convolution k-Max Pooling
Folding Fully Connected
Fig. 3: Dynamic Convolutional Neural Network (DCNN)
The architecture of a DCNN as illustrated by [37]. In this case, the
model is intended for a seven word input sentence of embedding
d = 4 with two convolutional layers (m = 3 and m = 2), two
(dynamic) k-max pooling layers (k = 5 and k = 3) within two
feature maps.
VII. EXPERIMENTATION
Table I presents a range of popular algorithms which were
selected for experimental analysis. These primitives are widely
utilised for both legitimate and fraudulent purposes.
CryptoKnight was configured to build two feature maps
from its first convolution, with a dropout probability of 0.6,
through a round of k-max pooling and non-linear activation.
Eleven hidden one-dimensional wide convolutions interspersed
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Fig. 4: Accuracy
with more tanh non-linear activations and k-max pooling fur-
ther reduced the feature space. Due to the number of embed-
dings the model utilised two folding operations simultaneously
prior to the penultimate pooling layer, after its convolution.
The final convolution built two additional feature maps and
then pooled on the stipulated topmost magnitude of 56. A
linear transformation, of output size 8, was then applied
with softmax to fully connect the model. Filter widths were
specified for the first and last convolutional layers of 20 and 12
respectfully, the remaining hidden layers shared a width of 10.
In total, the model employed 14 convolutions.
Category Algorithm
Symmetric AES
RC4
Blowfish
Asymmetric RSA
Hashing MD5
TABLE I: Cryptographic Algorithms
Based on a frequency analysis of simplified opcodes within
the sample pool, the mnemonics add, sub, inc, dec, shr, shl,
and, or, xor, pxor, test & lea were selected for weighting.
Therefore the final design matrix, of embedding 12, contained
a variable number of vectors corresponding to the numer-
ation and associated weightings of each basic block in a
subject binary. A distribution of size n = 750 was drawn
in which 75% was used for training and 25% remained for
testing. After 200 epochs, the model successfully converged
at 91.3% accuracy with a minimal loss of 0.29. Figure 4 shows
the test accuracy over 200 epochs, and Figure 5 displays its
simultaneous loss. An additional collection was then drawn
for validation. Table II diagnoses the pre-trained model’s
associated confusion on an additional n = 300 samples.
We collected five open source implementations, presented
in Table III, from GitHub 1 for Rivest Cipher 4 (RC4) and
1https://github.com
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Fig. 6: No Entropy
Blowfish. The resultant collection of binaries leveraged pure
(non-library linked) cryptographic functionality to assess our
method.
AES RC4 BLF MD5 RSA R/A
AES 37 0 0 0 13 0
RC4 0 50 0 0 0 0
BLF 0 8 42 0 0 0
MD5 0 2 7 41 0 0
RSA 19 0 0 0 30 1
R/A 0 0 0 0 0 50
TABLE II: Validation Results
x = predicted, y = actual
No representational RSA or MD5 instances were iden-
tified at time of testing. AES was overlooked due to the
model having been trained on cryptographically accelerated
binaries. The classification rate varied with hyper-parameter
optimisations and distribution sizes, but was able to correctly
classify 4/5 RC4 and 4/5 Blowfish samples in our tests.
Algorithm Source
RC4 github.com/ogay/rc4
github.com/tomaslu/rc4
github.com/Maihj/RC4
github.com/anthonywei/rc4/tree/master/c
github.com/shiffthq/rc4
Blowfish github.com/jdiez17/blowfish
github.com/Rupan/blowfish
github.com/rkhullar/cipher-c
github.com/genterist/simpleBlowFishX
github.com/JaseP88/Blowfish-Algorithm
TABLE III: Open Source Implementations
Analysing GnuPG 1.4.20, the software was directed to
encrypt an empty text document using 256-bit AES. With a
trace time of 1 minute 40 seconds, CryptoKnight predicted the
utilisation of RSA with AES.
VIII. DISCUSSION
Traditional cryptographic identification techniques are in-
herently expensive [8] [9] [11] [14] and heavily rely on human
intuition. CryptoKnight was built to reduce this associated
error-prone interaction. With refined sampling of the latent
feature space, a procedurally synthesised distribution allowed
our DCNN to map proportional linear sequences with a finer
granularity than that of conventional architectures without
overfitting, CryptoKnight converged at 91% accuracy without
extensive hyper-parameter optimisation. The model ultimately
fit the synthetic distribution with veritable ease, with perfor-
mance on par to that of [37].
The impediment of dynamic binary instrumentation was
made clear by [9] who highlighted an extensive twenty two
hour trace and analysis time. CryptoKnight’s analysis time also
varied, but not quite to this extent. Hence, for the sample
binaries, analysis took up to a maximum of around one
minute. Consequently, large collections saw exponential draw
times of indefinable length. Since manual analysis often takes
invariably longer than an adequate draw time, this footprint
is arguably marginal. Once trained, the proposed framework
would be most beneficial as part of an analyst’s toolkit - to
quickly verify any cryptographic instances.
8The DCNN was intended to map time-invariant crypto-
graphic execution despite control or data flow obfuscation.
An intrinsic problem of initial work and the approach by
used [28]. While successful, this formulation still has a
few preliminary issues to address. The predefined operator
embeddings explicitly define the entire feature set, therefore
new samples which perhaps deviate from traditional operation
may be unidentifiable. Should the framework not immediately
generalise to an additional algorithm, correlating its most pre-
dominant operators by interchanging embeddings or enlarging
the scope should enhance cognition.
A fundamental part of CryptoKnight’s supervised design is
that it can only classify known samples. New cryptographic
algorithms must be added to the generation pool - a process
this framework has strived to simplify, but an unavoidable
limitation of the proposed architecture. This also makes cus-
tom cryptography more difficult to classify, as no high-level
reference implementations would feasibly exist to import. Inte-
grating an unsupervised component into the core model could
facilitate the detection of non-cryptographic signatures. This,
or alternatively advanced synthesis could negate the need for
procedural generation entirely, to further reduce the presently
expensive time requirement and/or aid in the classification of
customised cryptography. A multi-class element that learns
application invariant primitives would also be prove beneficial
as CryptoKnight was exclusively trained on pre-combined
functions. A similar model could be re-purposed to decompile
binaries with more accuracy than traditional methods - which
typically only manage simplistic control flow.
The entropy metric assumes that a cryptographic function’s
associated uncertainty is higher than that of conventional in-
teraction. In the case of [8], this negatively affected the recog-
nition of simple substitution ciphers, however it is unlikely
to affect CryptoKnight in the same way due to its scoring
mechanics and demonstrably high accuracy in subjective tests
without the metric. Figure 6 proves that the entropy metric
does not impact classification rate, converging at 83.3% - 8˜%
difference.
Problems with cryptographic acceleration played an im-
portant role in the detection of native AES implementations.
Intel’s AES-NI extension was proposed in 2008 for boosting
the relative speed of encryption and decryption on micropro-
cessors from Intel and AMD. [39] describe the instruction set
with regard to its breakthrough performance increase. The six
instructions, prefixed by AES, directly perform each of the
cipher’s operations on the Streaming SIMD Extensions (SSE)
XMM registers, however, the natural progression of the cipher
could not be fully observed.
IX. CONCLUSION
Despite advanced countermeasures, the cryptovirological
threat has significantly increased over the last decade, in-
centivising the aforementioned research. Our research demon-
strated that cryptographic primitive classification in compiled
binary executables could be achieved successfully using a dy-
namic convolutional neural network. We also demonstrated our
implementation and achieved 91% accuracy without extensive
hyper-parameter optimisation. Moreover, our implementation
is fundamentally more flexible than that of previous work,
marginalising the error prone human element. The framework
successfully detected every implementation of RC4 and Blow-
fish (including externally sourced, native (non-library) written
compositions) and maintained a distinctively high accuracy on
synthetic implementations. Future work includes the detection
of cryptographic functions in parallel with the execution of a
subject binary.
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